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Abstract
Background: In spring 2008, a goat farm experiencing Q fever abortions (“Farm A”) was identified as the probable
source of a human Q fever outbreak in a Dutch town. In 2009, a larger outbreak with 347 cases occurred in the
town, despite no clinical Q fever being reported from any local farm.
Methods: Our study aimed to identify the source of the 2009 outbreak by applying a combination of interdisciplinary
methods, using data from several sources and sectors, to investigate seventeen farms in the area: namely, descriptive
epidemiology of notified cases; collation of veterinary data regarding the seventeen farms; spatial attack rate and
relative risk analyses; and GIS mapping of farms and smooth incidence of cases. We conducted further spatio-temporal
analyses that integrated temporal data regarding date of onset with spatial data from an atmospheric dispersion model
with the most highly suspected source at the centre.
Results: Our analyses indicated that Farm A was again the most likely source of infection, with persons living within
1 km of the farm at a 46 times larger risk of being a case compared to those living within 5-10 km. The spatio-temporal
analyses demonstrated that about 60 – 65 % of the cases could be explained by aerosol transmission from Farm A
assuming emission from week 9; these explained cases lived significantly closer to the farm than the unexplained cases
(p = 0.004). A visit to Farm A revealed that there had been no particular changes in management during the
spring/summer of 2009, nor any animal health problems around the time of parturition or at any other time
during the year.
Conclusions: We conclude that the probable source of the 2009 outbreak was the same farm implicated in 2008,
despite animal health indicators being absent. Veterinary and public health professionals should consider farms
with past as well as current history of Q fever as potential sources of human outbreaks.
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Background
Q fever is a zoonosis caused by the bacterium Coxiella
burnetii and is present worldwide with the exception of
New Zealand. Clinical disease in humans can range from
an acute influenza-like illness to a chronic infection mani-
festing mainly as endocarditis or vascular infection [1],
though 60 % of infections are asymptomatic. There is also
evidence of a “post Q-fever fatigue syndrome” manifesting
as chronic fatigue following acute infection [2]. The
animal reservoir for Q fever is large as a wide range of
mammals, birds, reptiles and fish can become infected
with C. burnetii, but cattle and small ruminants (sheep
and goats) are the most affected [1]. Clinical presentation
of Q fever in domestic ruminants is most commonly asso-
ciated with late abortions, stillbirth and delivery of weak
offspring [3–5]. The most frequent route of infection
for humans is from inhalation of aerosols contaminated
by infected ruminants at slaughter or parturition [1].
Windborne spread of such aerosols can cause infections
several kilometres from their origin [1, 6–9]. Furthermore,
environmental contamination related to parturition or
slaughter can last potentially from months to years,
making inhalation of contaminated dust a risk [1].
Between 2007 and 2010, the Netherlands experienced
the largest outbreak of Q fever ever reported, with over
4,000 notified cases [10, 11] and mainly associated
with dairy goat farms [10–13]. Since that time, a num-
ber of methodologies have been developed and applied
to investigate the epidemic. These methods incorporate
traditional epidemiological approaches alongside Geo-
graphic Information Systems (GIS) [12, 13], mathem-
atical modelling [14], and atmospheric dispersion models
[15]; and use data from a range of sectors and sources, in-
cluding animal, human, environmental and meteoro-
logical. In this sense, the Q-fever epidemic has offered
a unique opportunity to develop interdisciplinary,
“One-Health” methodologies to investigate airborne
and zoonotic disease.
In the spring/summer of 2008, a Q fever outbreak
occurred in an urban area (approximately 88,000 inhabi-
tants) in the south of the Netherlands with 96 cases notified
to the local Municipal Health Service (MHS), Brabant-Zui-
doost. Through use of a Geographic Information Sys-
tem, this outbreak was subsequently linked to a
commercial dairy goat farm (Farm A) that had experi-
enced a Q fever-related abortion wave in the weeks pre-
ceding the human outbreak [12]. Persons living within
2 km of the farm had over a thirty times higher risk for Q
fever than those living more than 5 km away, with risk de-
clining with increasing distance from the farm. This spatial
relationship, together with the fact that no other farms in
the locality had reported Q-fever problems, supported the
hypothesis that this single goat farm was the source of the
human outbreak.
In 2009, an even larger human outbreak occurred in the
town, with 347 cases notified to the same MHS between
April and July. However, in this year no farm in the local-
ity reported any clinical Q fever or related animal health
problems. The reasons for the upsurge in human cases
were unclear. Hypotheses included: increased reporting of
Q fever owing to greater awareness of the disease amongst
medical professionals and the community; the existence
of a new source or sources of infection; or Farm A being
again the source due to sub-clinical shedding or environ-
mental contamination. Our study aimed to integrate the
interdisciplinary methodologies and inter-sectoral data
developed and gathered since the start of the national
epidemic to identify the most likely origin of the 2009
outbreak in the area.
Methods
Case definition
We defined cases as residents of the Dutch Municipal
Health Service region ‘Brabant-Zuidoost’ who were notified
to the national surveillance system for infectious diseases as
having Q fever with date of onset of between weeks 11 and
36 (9 March-6 September), 2009. In 2009, the notification
criteria for Q fever were (1) fever, pneumonia or hepatitis,
and (2) evidence of C. burnetii infection through a fourfold
rise in IgG antibody titre in paired sera, presence of
IgM phase II antibodies, or detection of nucleic acid by
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) in blood or respira-
tory tract samples [16]. We excluded 48 cases who were
known to have attended farm viewing days at a Q fever
positive local petting farm in 2009, which had previ-
ously been implicated in transmission of the disease to
visitors [17].
Comparison of 2008 to 2009 cases
We compared the 2009 cases to cases notified in 2008
to the same MHS using descriptive analysis and standard
statistics (Student’s T-test or chi-square test as appropri-
ate). Specifically, we examined the cases in terms of time,
place and person (epidemic curve, age, gender ratio, and
postcode of residence accurate to neighbourhood level),
together with hospitalisation rates and time from date
of onset to laboratory confirmation to see if there were
any significant differences in these parameters in 2009
as compared to 2008. For 2008 cases, we used the same
case definition that Schimmer et al. [12] employed in
their investigation of the 2008 outbreak. Data were ana-
lysed using Stata 12.
Suspect source farm identification
Van Leuken et al. [14] identified 56 farms holding small
ruminants in the area of the 2009 outbreak, of which
seventeen were indicated to be potential sources
using an exponential model to fit Q fever incidence
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against increasing distance from each farm. We used three
approaches to investigate these seventeen farms further:
1) Collation of veterinary and farm data: we obtained
data from the Animal Health Service (GD) regarding
the farm location and number of goats and sheep
held in 2009 for each of the seventeen farms. We
also collated data on Q-fever history of each farm
from three sources: (1) clinical Q-fever notifications
in 2008 and 2009; (2) results of the non-mandatory
bulk tank milk testing for C. burnetii in 2008 on large
dairy goat farms (for which the take-up rate was ~75 %
of dairy goat farms with >50 animals) [18]; (3) results
of the mandatory, systematic bulk tank milk testing for
C. burnetii, introduced in October 2009 and conducted
at all dairy farms with >50 goats/sheep [10]; and (4)
results of previous animal and environmental Q-fever
investigations in the study area [19–21].
2) Concentric ring attack rate analyses: following the
approach used by Schimmer et al. [12] to investigate
the 2008 outbreak in the area, we used distance of a
case’s residence to a farm as a proxy for exposure
together with 2009 population data to calculate attack
rates (AR) for residents in concentric 1 km rings
around each potential source farm, up to a 5 km radius
(i.e. 0-1 km, 1-2 km, 2-3 km, 3-4 km and 4-5 km). We
also calculated the attack rate in a reference ring of 5-
10 km around each potential source farm and used this
to compute relative risks (RR) for each 1 km concentric
ring. Data were analysed using R version 3.0.3.
3) Mapping: using ArcGIS 9 software (ESRI, Redlands,
CA, USA), we geo-referenced the residential ad-
dresses of each case according to six figure postcode
(discriminatory down to street level) and used 2009
population data to produce smooth incidence maps,
as developed by Van der Hoek et al. [22] Briefly, this
method imposes a 500 x 500 m grid over the area of
interest; counts the number of cases and the popula-
tion number in each cell; and models the number of
cases as an inhomogenous Poisson process whereby
the underlying incidence is estimated by 2-dimensional
P-spline smoothing. We also mapped the seventeen
farms identified as potential sources, together with farm
size and animal species. As several farms were in close
proximity to each other, the ARs and RRs of a particular
farm calculated in the concentric ring analyses
could have been an artefact of the C. burnetii emissions
from a nearby farm; therefore mapping served to
visualise whether this phenomenon might be
occurring.
Further investigation of the most strongly suspected farm
We then performed the following additional investigations
for the farm most strongly associated with occurrence of
cases according to the previous methods (FarmA): (1) further
spatio-temporal analyses using this farm as the “emission
point” forC. burnetii, and (2) an on-site farm visit:
1) Spatio-temporal analyses using an atmospheric dis-
persion model: we defined a “period of probable infection
(PPI)” denoting the period during which a case was likely
to have been infected, i.e. 8–33 days (95 % CI) prior to the
date of onset of disease [23]. We hypothesised that rela-
tively high modelled concentrations of C. burnetii origin-
ating from Farm A during the PPI preceding a particular
case’s date of onset may indicate that the case in question
was infected via airborne transmission from the farm.
That is, if a case was infected by exposure to C. burnetii
from Farm A, it would have been exposed mainly during
its PPI rather than during the period prior to that.
To test this hypothesis, we applied an atmospheric dis-
persion model previously described by Van Leuken et al.
[15] to model the airborne transmission of C. burnetii.
The model calculates the physical dispersion of C. burnetii
bacteria from a particular emission point (in this case a
farm) by taking into account hourly-based meteorological
data, including wind velocity and direction. The model
output consists of hourly averaged C. burnetii concentra-
tion matrices which are then converted to period-specific
averaged concentration maps.
We inserted hourly averaged local meteorological condi-
tions from the Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute
into the model and performed sensitivity analyses on the
threshold wind velocity (0, 2, 4 and 6 m/s) and the emission
profile: conYear (constant emission in time) or lNormEpi
(log-normal emission curve) starting from the first day of
the kidding season (for details see Van Leuken et al. [15]).
For a case i, we determined the cumulative modelled con-
centration at its street-level postcode during its PPI (CPPI,i),
and also prior to the PPI (CPRE,i). Subsequently, we divided
all cases into two groups: “group 1”, containing all cases
who had a higher cumulative concentration during their
PPI compared to prior to it (CPPI > CPRE); and “group 2”’
containing all cases with a higher cumulative concentration
prior to their PPI compared to during the PPI (CPPI ≤CPRE).
In other words, a case with a cumulative exposure ratio
CPPI: CPRE of 90:10 was clearly attributed to group 1,
whereas a case with a ratio of 10:90 was attributed to
group 2. The cut-off was thus set at 50:50. Figure 1 gives an
example of the classification of cases into groups 1 and 2.
We created histograms of both groups as a function of
distance from Farm A, and, in addition, we determined
the relative abundance of cases (ϕ) per group per circu-





where nr,1 and nr,2 are the number of cases in ring r in
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group 1 and 2 respectively, and n1 and n2 are the total
number of cases per group. Thus, the denominator and
the numerator give the proportion of cases in each
group as a function of distance. Variable ϕ then gives
the ratio of these proportions and thus determines
which group is over-represented as a function of dis-
tance from Farm A.
For the purposes of the model, we assumed that emis-
sion of C. burnetii from the farm started in week 9 in
2009, i.e. two weeks before the first cases were notified
(to correspond approximately with the incubation period
of 8 – 33 days [23]). However, to test the dependence of
ϕ on the week that the emissions commenced, we add-
itionally performed a sensitivity analysis regarding week
of emission.
Finally, we performed a Kruskal-Wallis test (a non-
parametric test) to compare the median distance of both
groups to the suspected source farm (since the cases are
spatially clustered and therefore the incidence-distance
relationship is exponentially curved [14], these medians
(or means) cannot be compared using a standard t-test,
which assumes normality). We compared the resulting
T-statistic to a χ2-distribution with one degree of free-
dom, assuming a threshold for significance of p < 0.05.
2) Farm visit: on 17 August 2012, we visited Farm A
and interviewed the farmer using a semi-structured
questionnaire to gain insight into the farm characteris-
tics, husbandry methods, breeding periods, and animal
health status in spring-summer 2009.
Ethics
Q fever is a notifiable disease in the Netherlands and
according to Dutch legislation, written consent from
patients for the use of anonymised surveillance data is not
necessary. Therefore, ethical review was not required. The
Municipal Health Service Brabant-Zuidoost made the case
information available to the researchers. However, publica-
tion of this case information is not permitted.
Results
Comparison of 2008 to 2009 cases
1) Time and Place: a total of 320 cases met the 2009
case definition, compared to 96 in 2008. All cases identi-
fied in 2009 were different from those identified in 2008,
ie were new cases. Figure 2 shows the distribution of
cases over time from 2008 to 2009. The 2008 and 2009
outbreaks both started and ended at broadly similar
times, with date of onset of cases between weeks 16 and
32 in 2008 compared to weeks and 11 and 36 in 2009.
The peak number of cases occurred in week 23 in 2008
(n = 19) compared to week 15 in 2009 (n = 54). Cases
lived in similar postcode areas to the 2008 outbreak [12],
with the same two neighbourhoods being most affected
both in 2008 and 2009 (65 % of cases and 53 % of cases
respectively); these two neighbourhoods are contiguous.
2) Demographics: the age and gender of cases did not
differ significantly between 2008 and 2009. In 2008, median
age affected was 50, compared to 49 in 2009 (p = 0.79). In
2008, 68.8 % of cases were male compared to 61.6 % in
2009 (p = 0.20).
3) Hospitalisation rate and laboratory confirmation
delay: hospitalisation rate in 2009 was higher than in
2008 (23.7 % and 18.8 % respectively), but this difference
was not significant (p = 0.56). Laboratory confirmation
delay (time between date of symptom onset and date of
laboratory confirmation) was significantly shorter in 2009
compared to 2008 (p = 0.0001), with a median delay of
20 days in 2009 compared to 29 days in 2008.
































Fig. 1 Assignment of cases to group 1 and group 2. Example of cases in groups 1 (left) and 2 (right). The vertical solid red lines indicate a case’s
date of onset of disease; the vertical dashed red lines indicate the period of probable infection (PPI), being 8 – 33 days before the date of onset
of disease [23]. The grey polygon indicates the cumulative dose prior to the PPI (CPRE); the red polygon indicates the cumulative dose during the
PPI (CPPI). The probability of infection has increased to 1.0 at the end of the PPI. For cases in group 1 the surface of the red polygon is greater
than that of the grey polygon (CPPI > CPRE); and vice versa for cases in group 2 (CPPI ≤ CPRE)
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Suspect source farm identification
Collation of veterinary and farm data
Table 1 describes the farms in terms of their size, species
and Q fever history. Of the seventeen farms, eight had
only goats, seven only sheep and two were mixed. Farm
A was the largest farm with 791 goats (no sheep); Farm
H was the second largest with 175 sheep (no goats), and
the remaining farms all had fewer than 40 animals.
Three of the seventeen farms had a history of Q fever.
Farm A had clinical Q fever (abortion wave) in 2008,
had tested positive for C. burnetii during bulk tank milk
(BTM) testing in 2008 and 2009; and had almost 100 %
of various samples testing positive in previous investiga-
tions since the original 2008 outbreak (vaginal and stable
environmental swabs in 2009 [20]; and aerosol samples
in the stable and the outdoor environment, together
with swabs from the stable environment, in 2010 [21].
Farm H had 5/20 positive samples [20], and Farm C
had 3/12 positive swabs in 2008 [20]. The remaining four-
teen farms were too small (<50 animals) to have qualified
for bulk tank milk testing, and had neither been included



















Week of onset2008 2009
Fig. 2 Distribution of Q fever cases over time, 2008 and 2009 outbreaks. The figure shows Q fever cases that were notified to the Brabant-Zuidoost
Municipal Health Service during the 2008 and 2009 outbreaks in the area. Cases that were linked to visiting an infected petting farm in 2009 are
excluded. [17]
Table 1 Characteristics and Q fever history of potential source farms
Farm No. sheep (′09) No. goats (′09) Abortion history? BTM 2008 BTM 2009 De Bruin et al. (2011) De Bruin et al. (2012) De Bruin et al. (2013)
A 0 791 April 2008 Positive Positive n.i. 48/49 (Oct ′09) 20/20 (May ′09′)
B 0 5 None n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i.
C 0 8 None n.i. n.i. 3/12 (′08) n.i. n.i.
D 37 0 None n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i.
E 2 0 None n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i.
F 31 0 None n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i.
G 0 2 None n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i.
H 175 0 None n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. 5/20 (May ′09)
I 36 0 None n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i.
J 0 2 None n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i.
K 9 0 None n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i.
L 0 2 None n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i.
M 4 3 None n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i.
N 4 4 None n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i.
O 0 6 None n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i.
P 9 0 None n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i.
Q 0 2 None n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i. n.i.
Farm characteristics (number of sheep and goats in 2009) and known Q fever history (abortion, bulk tank milk screening, and results of previous targeted Q fever
studies) for the seventeen potential source farms, Note that bulk tank milk (BTM) was monitored by the Animal Health Service on a volunteer basis from October
2008 at dairy farms with >50 goats/sheep [18], and was mandatory from October 2009 for all dairy goat and sheep farms with >50 animals [10]. For the previous
Q fever studies [19–21], we have indicated the number of positive vaginal and/or stable environmental samples found;. “n.i.” means that the farm was not
included in that particular study
Ladbury et al. BMC Infectious Diseases  (2015) 15:372 Page 5 of 11
however, none had reported any clinical Q fever nor
abortion problems to the Animal Health Service in
2008 or 2009.
Concentric ring attack rate analyses
Figure 3 shows the Relative Risk for Q fever with in-
creasing distance from each of the seventeen farms (data
are presented in Additional file 1: Table S1). Farms A, B
and E had the most striking distance-response relationship,
followed by G, and then D, C, and F to a lesser extent. The
remaining ten farms showed no clear relationship between
distance from farm and RR. Farm A had the highest overall
attack rate in the 0–1 km ring at 2156 cases per 100,000
population, although the 0-1 km attack rates for Farms B
(1802 cases per 100,000 population), E (1818 cases per
100,000 population), F (1031 cases per 100,000 population)
and G (1132 cases per 100,000 population) were not statis-
tically significantly different to this figure. Farm A also had
the highest relative risk in the 0–1 km ring compared to
the 5–10 km reference ring (RR = 46; 95 % CIs 22–97).
Mapping
Figure 4 shows the map of the residential addresses of
notified cases, the location and size of the seventeen
potential source farms, and the smooth incidence of
human cases in the locality over the outbreak period
(weeks 11–36). Reflecting the results of the concentric
rings analysis, Farms B and E were in closest proximity
to Farm A (502 m and 196 m respectively), followed
by Farm G (801 m).
Further investigation of the most strongly suspected farm
Taking all the above information together, Farm A was
identified as the most strongly suspected potential source
farm. Our reasoning for this is as follows: it was by far the
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Fig. 3 Relative risks per concentric ring for the seventeen selected farms A – Q. The curve of Farm A is displayed in red
Fig. 4 Map of the residential locations of cases (six-digit postcode)
and the location of the seventeen farms A – Q selected from the
study of van Leuken et al. [14] with the size of the circle
proportional to their number of animals (yellow: goat farms, blue:
sheep farms, green: farms that kept both goats and sheep). As a
background the incidence is presented as a smoothed map, based
on the method of van der Hoek et al. [22]
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clinical Q fever (2008) plus positive BTM investigations
subsequently in 2008 and 2009; it was a goat farm rather
than a sheep farm (goat farms being more frequently indi-
cated in the Dutch Q fever epidemic than sheep farms
[11]); and the results of the concentric rings analysis com-
bined with the mapping pointed most strongly towards it
(although Farms B and E also had very strong distance-RR
relationships in the concentric rings analysis, the mapping
showed that they were both very close to Farm A. There-
fore we considered that these relationships were likely to
be an artefact of proximity, particularly given that Farm B
held only five goats and Farm E, two sheep).
Spatio-temporal analyses using an atmospheric dispersion
model
Figure 5 (upper two rows) shows the histograms of the
number of cases in groups 1 and 2 as a function of dis-
tance for emission profile conYear, stratified by the
threshold wind velocity (see Additional file 2: Figure S1
for emission profile lNormEpi). These results show that
approximately 60 – 65 % of the cases are attributed to
group 1. Also, the emission profile and threshold wind
speed have little influence on the shape of the distribu-
tions. The third row shows the ratio of the proportions (ϕ)
from equation 1: group 1 is over-represented at distances
up to 5 km (i.e. the points lie above 1.0). At distances
of 5 – 7 km, in contrast, group 2 seems to be over-
represented (i.e. the points lie below 1.0), although the
absolute number of cases is smaller. Note that the first
point should be interpreted carefully as the number of
cases up to 1000 m in group 1 is equal to zero. Additional
file 3: Figure S2 shows the actual cumulative concentra-
tions (CPPI and CPRI) per case.
Figure 6 shows the results of the sensitivity analysis of
the number of cases in group 1 as a function of the
starting week of emissions (assuming emission profile
conYear and a threshold wind velocity of 2 m/s). In our
model, we assumed that the emissions commenced in
week 9, corresponding with about 61 % of the cases clas-
sified to group 1; however, if we had set the first week of
emissions to be week 12 or 13, then this number would
have been slightly higher at approximately 69 %.
Table 2 shows the median distances of a case’s resi-
dence to Farm A per group as a function of the thresh-
old wind velocity. The 95 % confidence intervals were
determined by bootstrapping 10,000 times. According to
the Kruskal-Wallis test the median distance of group 1
is always significantly lower (p ≈ 0.004) than that of
group 2, indicating that cases of group 1 are, on average,
living closer to Farm A than cases of group 2. The frac-
tion of cases classified to group 1 has little association
with emission profile or threshold wind velocity.
Fig. 5 Results of spatio-temporal analysis. Plots as function of the threshold wind velocity (V0, V2, V4, V6) for emission profile conYear. Upper row:
histograms of the number of cases in group 1 as function of distance [km]. Second row: idem for group 2. Third row: ratio of the proportion
of cases (ϕ) as function of distance per 1 km. Fourth row: logs of the cumulative concentrations during the incubation period (CPPI) per group
(G1 [red bullet], G2 [blue bullet]) as a function of distance. Equations of the linear regression lines are given as well as the R2’s of the data
Ladbury et al. BMC Infectious Diseases  (2015) 15:372 Page 7 of 11
Finally, the bottom row in Fig. 5 shows the logs of the
cumulative concentrations that cases were exposed to
during their PPI (CPPI) for emission profile conYear and
threshold wind velocities of 0, 2, 4, and 6 m/s (V0, V2,
V4, V6 respectively). The results show that the differ-
ences between the groups were very small, but for higher
threshold wind speeds the cumulative concentration
during the PPI was higher in group 1. Note that the data
become more scattered for high threshold wind speeds:
this is caused by a more plume-shaped exposure pattern
(with higher contrast) for the cumulative concentration
maps (see Additional file 3: Figure S2).
Visit to Farm A: in 2009, the goats were kept on a deep
litter system with fresh straw added daily. The shed was
mechanically ventilated. The litter was removed three to
four times during the year. No further cleaning was done
before replenishing with fresh litter. Birthing products
were not cleared from the pens during the kidding season.
The farmer could not recall any particular changes in
management in the spring/summer of 2009, nor any
animal health problems around the time of parturition or
at any other time during the year. The goats had not been
vaccinated against Q fever in 2008, but were vaccinated
against the disease in May/June 2009. Although the farmer
had collected data regarding the period of kidding, num-
bers of kids born and number of live/still births in 2009
for submission to the Animal Health Service, he no longer
had these data available. We were unable to access these
data from the Animal Health Service independently.
Discussion
This study aimed to identify the most likely origin of an
outbreak of Q fever in an urban area in 2009 that occurred
in the absence of any clinical Q-fever notifications from
surrounding farms that year. Our results suggest that the
most likely source of this outbreak was the same dairy
goat farm, Farm A, as had been implicated in a smaller
outbreak in the area the previous year. We gathered data
from a wide range of sources and sectors (animal, human,








Week of first emissions
01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17
Fig. 6 Sensitivity analysis. Sensitivity analysis demonstrating the percentage of cases in group 1 as a function of the week number that the
emissions from Farm A would have started





Number of cases Distance to Farm A (median and 95 % CI) Kruskal-Wallis
p-valueGroup 1 Group 2 Group 1 Group 2
con Year 0 148 92 2760 [2345; 3062] 3207 [2680; 3652] 0.0094
2 148 92 2612 [2182; 2970] 3491 [3002; 3890] 0.0001
4 154 86 2735 [2326; 3038] 3308 [2804; 3692] 0.0055
6 144 96 2694 [2372; 3018] 3352 [2968; 3742] 0.0054
lNormEpi 0 155 85 2747 [2372; 3053] 3259 [2804; 3789] 0.0029
2 153 87 2661 [2222; 3018] 3393 [2982; 3751] 0.0012
4 151 89 2715 [2301; 3022] 3372 [2812; 3742] 0.0032
6 140 100 2670 [2274; 3018] 3317 [2920; 3602] 0.0026
Number of cases and median distance of cases’ residence (six-figure postcode) from Farm A per group, stratified by emission profile and the threshold wind
speed. The last column gives the p-values of the Kruskal-Wallis test
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interdisciplinary methods incorporating both traditional
and innovative techniques in order to reach this conclu-
sion. Integrated approaches such as these are increasingly
recognised as key to One Health research. The mecha-
nisms underlying zoonotic disease emergence and trans-
mission are invariably complex and multi-factorial, such
that understanding them requires interdisciplinary work
that applies a holistic set of methodologies and data from
the human health, veterinary, and environmental sectors
[24, 25]. For the purposes of this study, we also developed
a new method that enabled the integration of spatial data
generated through an atmospheric dispersion model with
temporal data concerning time of probable infection. This
method could prove valuable to future Q fever outbreak
investigations as it can serve to disentangle acute aerosol
transmission from a point source from diffuse environ-
mental transmission.
While comparison of the area’s 2008 outbreak data to
its 2009 outbreak data suggests that there was a higher
awareness of Q fever among the public and medical
community in the area in 2009 compared to 2008 (demon-
strated by the significantly shorter period between date of
onset of disease and date of laboratory confirmation in
2009), the similar demographics of cases in terms of time,
place and person and the lack of a reduction in hospitalisa-
tion rate do not support the hypothesis that the increase in
cases of Q fever seen in 2009 was caused solely by changes
in reporting behaviour. Instead, our results suggest that
this was a true outbreak rather than a reporting artefact,
with Farm A as the probable source. The timing of the
2009 outbreak (in the spring around the kidding season)
suggests that the outbreak was due to goats sub-clinically
shedding C. burnetii during this period, rather than due to
environmental contamination of Farm A and its surrounds
during 2008.
This is supported by the results of spatio-temporal
analyses using an atmospheric distribution model. By
means of this method, we calculated the proportion of
cases that were mainly exposed during their probable
period of infection (PPI), namely 60 – 65 % of the cases.
Thus, these cases could be explained by airborne trans-
mission of C. burnetii from Farm A. The other cases
were mainly exposed prior to their PPI; explanations for
this could be that (1) they were absent from home during
high-exposure hours/days, or (2) they did not happen
to inhale an infected particle during the PPI by chance,
despite high concentrations around their area of residence
at that time, or (3) they were infected by a different source
(including re-aerosolised bacteria from contaminated
environments).
It has been suggested that C. burnetii may still be ex-
creted via the placenta during normal parturition [3, 4, 26,
27] even in vaccinated animals, albeit to a lesser extent
[28]. A recent meta-analysis of studies investigating the
effect of vaccination on shedding suggested that while
vaccination significantly reduced the risk of shedding
form uterine secretions in previously exposed goats,
shedding through all other routes (milk, vaginal secretions
and faeces) was not significantly reduced. [29] Furthermore,
farms that have experienced Q fever-related abortions in
the past have been shown to have higher proportions of C.
burnetii-positive animal and environmental samples, and
higher levels of C. burnetii DNA within those positive
samples compared to both farms negative for Q fever
and farms positive on bulk milk sampling but with no
history of abortion. Unfortunately detailed veterinary/hus-
bandry data were unavailable regarding the start, end and
peak kidding periods or other on-farm events in 2009 (e.g.
removal of litter from the pen) that might have contrib-
uted to the rise in human cases. For the purposes of the
model, we assumed that C. burnetti emission started in
week 9, two weeks before the first notification. Although
the proportion of explained cases would have been larger
had we assumed an emission start in week 12 or 13 (Fig. 6),
cases with weeks of onset between weeks 11 and 14 would
subsequently have been missed by the model.
The model also demonstrated a strong relationship
between distance from cases’ residence to Farm A and
incidence of Q fever stratified by group. Cases belonging
to group 1 (i.e. mainly exposed during their PPI) were
over-represented at distances of up to 4 to 5 kilometres
from Farm A, while cases in group 2 were living at rela-
tively further distances of 5 to 8 kilometres (there were
too few cases at 9 km and 10 km to draw conclusions
about these distances). Also, cases in group 1 were gen-
erally exposed to higher doses during their PPI (Fig. 5)
compared to cases in group 2. Note that we did not look
at the difference in absolute exposure between cases, but
instead at the exposure per case. After all, the probability
of infection is always 100 % at the end of a case’s PPI, re-
gardless of the actual dose. Nevertheless, other sources
could have increased the actual dose and thus the prob-
ability of infection. Furthermore, while choice of emission
profile (i.e. conYear and lNormEpi) and threshold wind
velocity had only a minor effect on the proportion of
explained cases (Fig. 5 and Additional file 2: Figure S1),
exposure at short distances up to 4-5 km was an im-
portant indicator for disease. These results complement
the findings from concentric rings attack rate analyses
in both this study and previous studies [12, 13] which
have indicated that persons living within 5 km of an in-
fected farm are at particular risk of contracting Q fever.
Although seventeen farms were included for investi-
gation at the outset, we focussed our farm visit and
spatio-temporal analyses to include Farm A only. It could
be argued that, despite the weight of evidence pointing
to Farm A, similar investigations should have been per-
formed at all farms for the purposes of fair comparison.
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One argument for focussing on Farm A was its size;
with 791 animals it was by far the largest farm of the
seventeen: indeed, fifteen farms had under 40 animals,
twelve of which had under ten. The only other large
farm, Farm H (175 sheep), was not further investigated
because the concentric rings analysis and smooth inci-
dence mapping did not point towards it; however, five
out of 20 environmental and aerosol samples taken at
and around the farm in 2009/2010 tested positive for C.
burnetii [21]. Furthermore, although it may be consid-
ered unlikely that the small farms would be the source
of such a large human outbreak, it is theoretically pos-
sible. Unfortunately, because these farms were so small,
they did not fall under statutory regulations for bulk
tank milk sampling; neither had they been included in
previous investigations, so we had no data to rule out
Q fever in these farm animals. Ideally, all seventeen
farms would have been individually visited and animals
sampled as part of our investigations; however, our re-
sources did not permit this and we focussed on the
most strongly suspected farm only. With regards the
spatio-temporal modelling: the concentric rings ana-
lyses suggested most strongly that farms A, B and E,
and possibly G, warranted further investigation. However,
as these farms were so close to Farm A, any results yielded
from atmospheric dispersion model centred on these farms
would have been almost identical to that for Farm A and
therefore would have yielded almost identical information.
Caution is called for in the interpretation of the spatio-
temporal analyses. The method requires that cases are
assigned into one of two distinct groups: those who were
exposed to a higher modelled concentration of C. burnetii
in the 8–33 days before date of onset (the period of prob-
able infection, PPI) compared to prior to it (group 1), and
those who had a higher modelled concentration prior to
their PPI compared to during the it (group 2). However,
this was not always a straightforward distinction (Fig. 5)
and some cases may have been mis-assigned. It is difficult
to extrapolate from modelled concentration at a particular
postcode area to the actual level of exposure of a person
in reality: for example, a case may have been absent from
their residence during their PPI; there may have been a
relatively low number of contaminated particles in their
particular street; or they may have been exposed to other
sources in addition to Farm A.
Conclusions
Our study found that most likely source of a large urban
outbreak of Q fever in 2009 was the same dairy goat farm
implicated in a smaller outbreak in the area the previous
year. The results of our investigations highlight that farms
with a history of Q fever can still pose a risk to public
health even when there are no animal health indicators
such as abortion storms or other fertility problems. We
recommend that veterinary and public health profes-
sionals consider farms with past as well as current his-
tory of Q fever as potential sources of human outbreaks.
We used a variety of methods to reach our conclusions, in-
cluding a newly developed method to investigate such out-
breaks in space and time using an atmospheric
dispersion model. Using meteorological forecast data,
this method could potentially be used prospectively to
visualise the spread of Coxiella bacteria and inform in-
fectious disease prevention and response measures.
Additional files
Additional file 1: Table S1. Attack rates and relative risks per potential
source farm. Number of cases, number of total inhabitants, attack rates
(AR) per 100,000 inhabitants, and relative risks (RR) per concentric 1 km
ring around each potential source farm A – Q. (XLS 29 kb)
Additional file 2: Figure S1. Results of spatio-temporal analysis using
an alternative emission profile. As for Fig. 5, but for emission profile
lNormEpi. (PDF 564 kb)
Additional file 3: Figure S2. Actual cumulative concentrations (CPPI
and CPRI) per case. Cumulative concentration during the PPI (CPPI) as a
function of the cumulative concentration prior to the PPI (CPRE) for each
case (emission profile conYear, threshold wind velocity 2 m/s). Cases in
group 1 are denoted by red closed circles [red bullet]; cases in group 2
by blue open circles [blue bullet]. (PDF 7 kb)
Abbreviations
AR: Attack Rate; BTM: Bulk Tank Milk; GD: Animal Health Service;
GIS: Geographic Information System; MHS: Municipal Health Service;
PPI: Period of Probable Infection; PCR: Polymerase Chain Reaction;
RR: Relative Risk.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Authors’ contributions
GL designed and implemented the study methods, except for those involving
the application of the atmospheric distribution model and spatio-temporal
analysis, which were designed and implemented by JvL. AS supervised the
design, implementation and interpretation of the methods conducted by
JvL. PV supervised and facilitated all parts of the study that related to animal
data, and co-conducted the on-farm visit together with GL. BS contributed to
the design of the methods. RTS provided data and background on the 2008
and 2009 outbreaks in the town. WvdH conceived of the project and provided
overall supervision throughout. GL drafted the manuscript, which was reviewed
and approved by all authors.
Authors’ information
Joint first author: Georgia Ladbury and Jeroen van Leuken.
Acknowledgements
We thank Ben Bom for producing the maps; Maaike van Veen for critical
review of the study proposal; and Ioannis Karagiannis and Marianne van der
Sande for critical review of the study protocol and manuscript. This project
was funded by the core funding of the RIVM/EPIET programme and the
RIVM strategic research facility (SOR project S/210206/01/RQ).
Author details
1Centre for Infectious Disease Control, National Institute for Public Health
and the Environment (RIVM), PO Box 1, 3720 BA Bilthoven, The Netherlands.
2European Programme for Intervention Epidemiology Training (EPIET),
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, Tomtebodavägen 11a,
171 83 Stockholm, Sweden. 3Institute for Risk Assessment Sciences (IRAS),
Utrecht University, Domplein 29, 3512 JE Utrecht, The Netherlands.
4Department of Small Ruminant Health, Animal Health Service (GD),
Ladbury et al. BMC Infectious Diseases  (2015) 15:372 Page 10 of 11
Arnsbergstraat 7, 7418 EZ Deventer, The Netherlands. 5Municipal Health
Service Brabant-Zuidoost, Clausplein 10, 5611 XP Eindhoven, The
Netherlands.
Received: 5 December 2014 Accepted: 4 August 2015
References
1. Parker NR, Barralet JH, Bell AM. Seminar Q fever. Lancet. 2006;367:679–88.
2. Marmion BP, Shannon M, Maddocks I, Storm P, Penttila I. Protracted debility
and fatigue after acute Q fever. Lancet. 1996;347:977–8.
3. Rousset E, Berri M, Durand B, Dufour P, Prigent M, Delcroix T, et al. Coxiella
burnetii shedding routes and antibody response after outbreaks of Q
fever-induced abortion in dairy goat herds. Appl Environ Microbiol.
2009;75:428–33.
4. Berri M, Rousset E, Champion JL, Russo P, Rodolakis A. Goats may
experience reproductive failures and shed Coxiella burnetii at two successive
parturitions after a Q fever infection. Res Vet Sci. 2007;83:47–52.
5. Roest H-J, Van Gelderen B, Dinkla A, Frangoulidis D, Van Zijderveld F, Rebel
J, et al. Q fever in pregnant goats: pathogenesis and excretion of Coxiella
burnetii. PLoS ONE. 2012;7.
6. Hawker JI, Ayres JG, Blair I, Evans MR, Smith DL, Smith EG, et al. A large
outbreak of Q fever in the West Midlands: windborne spread into a
metropolitan area? Commun Dis Public Health. 1998;1:180–7.
7. Tissot-Dupont H, Amadei M, Nezri M, Raoult D. Wind in November, Q fever
in December. Emerg Infect Dis. 2004;10:1264–9.
8. EFSA. Scientific Opinion on Q fever. EFSA Journal. 2010;8(5):1595.
9. Wallensten A, Moore P, Webster H, Johnson C, Van der Burgt G, Pritchard G,
et al. Q fever outbreak in Cheltenham, United Kingdom, in 2007 and the
use of dispersion modelling to investigate the possibility of airborne spread.
Eurosurveillance. 2010;15:1–7.
10. Roest HIJ, Tilburg JJHC, Van der Hoek W, Vellema P, Van Zijderveld FG,
Klaassen CHW, et al. The Q fever epidemic in The Netherlands: history,
onset, response and reflection. Epidemiol Infect. 2011;139:1–12.
11. Dijkstra F, Van der Hoek W, Wijers N, Schimmer B, Rietveld A, Wijkmans CJ,
et al. The 2007–2010 Q fever epidemic in The Netherlands: characteristics of
notified acute Q fever patients and the association with dairy goat farming.
FEMS Immunol Med Microbiol. 2012;64:3–12.
12. Schimmer B, Ter Schegget R, Wegdam M, Züchner L, De Bruin A,
Schneeberger PM, et al. The use of a geographic information system to
identify a dairy goat farm as the most likely source of an urban Q-fever
outbreak. BMC Infect Dis. 2010;10.
13. Hackert VH, Van der Hoek W, Dukers-Muijrers N, De Bruin A, Al Dahouk S,
Neubauer H, et al. Q Fever: Single-point source outbreak with high attack
rates and massive number of undetected infections across an entire region.
Clin Infect Dis. 2012.
14. Van Leuken JPG, Havelaar AH, Van der Hoek W, Ladbury GAF, Hackert VH,
Swart AN. A model for the early identification of sources of airborne
pathogens in an outdoor environment. PLoS ONE. 2013;8, e80412.
15. Van Leuken JPG, van de Kassteele J, Sauter FJ, Van der Hoek W, Heederik D,
Havelaar AH, et al. Improved correlation of human Q fever incidence to
modelled C. burnetii concentrations by means of an atmospheric dispersion
model. Int J Health Geogr. 2015;14:14.
16. Van der Hoek W, Morroy G, Renders NH, Wever PC, Hermans MH, Leenders
AC, et al. Epidemic Q Fever in Humans in the Netherlands. In: Coxiella
burnetii: Recent Advances and New Perspectives in Research of the Q Fever
Bacterium. Advances in Experimental Medicine and Biology. 2012. p. 329–64.
17. Whelan J, Schimmer B, De Bruin A, Robert-Du Ry Van Beest Holle M, Van
der Hoek W, Ter Schegget R. Visits on “lamb-viewing days” at a sheep farm
open to the public was a risk factor for Q fever in 2009. Epidemiol Infect.
2012;140:858–64.
18. Van den Brom R, Van Engelen E, Luttikholt S, Moll L, Van Maanen K, Vellema
P. Coxiella burnetii in bulk tank milk samples from dairy goat and dairy
sheep farms in The Netherlands in 2008. Vet Rec. 2012;170:310.
19. De Bruin A, De Groot A, De Heer L, Bok J, Wielinga PR, Hamans M, et al.
Detection of Coxiella burnetii in complex matrices by using multiplex
quantitative PCR during a major Q fever outbreak in The Netherlands. Appl
Environ Microbiol. 2011;77:6516–23.
20. De Bruin A, Van der Plaats RQJ, De Heer L, Paauwe R, Schimmer B, Vellema
P, et al. Detection of Coxiella burnetii DNA on small-ruminant farms during a
Q fever outbreak in the Netherlands. Appl Environ Microbiol. 2012;78:1652–7.
21. De Bruin A, Janse I, Koning M, De Heer L, Van der Plaats RQJ, Van Leuken
JPG, et al. Detection of Coxiella burnetii DNA in the environment during and
after a large Q fever epidemic in the Netherlands. J Appl Microbiol.
2013;114:1395–404.
22. Van der Hoek W, Van de Kassteele J, Bom B, De Bruin A, Dijkstra F,
Schimmer B, et al. Smooth incidence maps give valuable insight into Q
fever outbreaks in The Netherlands. Geospatial Health. 2012;7:127–34.
23. Porten K, Rissland J, Tigges A, Broll S, Hopp W, Lunemann M, et al. A
super-spreading ewe infects hundreds with Q fever at a farmers’ market
in Germany. BMC Infect Dis. 2006;6:147.
24. Daszak P, Zambrana-Torrelio C, Bogich TL, Fernandez M, Epstein JH, Murray
K, et al. Interdisciplinary approaches to understanding disease emergence:
The past, present, and future drivers of Nipah virus emergence. Proc Natl
Acad Sci. 2012;110:3681. doi:3688.
25. Zinsstag J, Schelling E, Waltner-Toews D, Tanner M. From “one medicine” to
“one health” and systemic approaches to health and well-being. Preventive
veterinary medicine. 2011;101:148–56.
26. Hatchette TF, Hudson RC, Schlech WF, Campbell N, Hatchette JE, Ratnam S,
et al. Goat-associated Q fever: a new disease in Newfoundland. Emerg Infect
Dis. 2001;7:413–9.
27. Roest HIJ, Ruuls RC, Tilburg JJHC, Nabuurs-Franssen MH, Klaassen CHW,
Vellema P, et al. Molecular epidemiology of Coxiella burnetii from ruminants
in Q fever outbreak, the Netherlands. Emerg Infect Dis. 2011;17:668–75.
28. Hogerwerf L, Van den Brom R, Roest HIJ, Bouma A, Vellema P, Pieterse M,
et al. Reduction of Coxiella burnetii prevalence by vaccination of goats and
sheep, The Netherlands. Emerg Infect Dis. 2011;17:379–86.
29. O’Neill TJ, Sargeant JM, Poljak Z. A systematic review and meta-analysis of
phase I inactivated vaccines to reduce shedding of Coxiella burnetii from
sheep and goats from routes of public health importance. Zoonoses and
public health. 2014;61:519–33.
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color ﬁgure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
Ladbury et al. BMC Infectious Diseases  (2015) 15:372 Page 11 of 11
